



Rôle décisif de Chissano Après le renversement de l'ancien régime, Madagascar a fait l'objet de multiples sanctions internationales. Suite à la publication des câbles diplomatiques américains notamment ceux de l'ambassade de Maputo, on sait que le médiateur Joaquim Chissano a joué un rôle important sur ce sujet. On se souvient encore de l'« humiliation » du pays suite à l'interdiction faite à la délégation malgache de monter à la tribune de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en septembre 2009. Si l'ensemble des observateurs ont estimé qu'il s'agissait d'une initiative de la SADC défendue par le ministre congolais des Affaires étrangères, la note diplomatique référencée R181239Z du 9 septembre 2009 nuance. On y lit notamment que c'est Joaquim Chissano lui-même qui a soutenu qu'Andry Rajoelina ne doit pas être autorisé à prendre la parole car cela lui permettra « de montrer aux Malgaches que la communauté internationale l'accepte ». D'autant que, selon les indications de Chissano, le régime transitoire a mené des actions de lobbying dans certains pays notamment asiatiques tels que l'Inde, la Thaïlande ou encore l'Indonésie. Le médiateur a donc demandé aux Américains leur soutien afin d'empêcher le Président de la HAT de monter à la tribune onusienne en utilisant la Commission de vérification des pouvoirs de l'ONU. Il a également cherché à contacter le Président congolais, ainsi que le Président de la Commission de l'Union africaine pour défendre cette cause. On connaît la suite, Andry Rajoelina a été privée de parole.

AGOA

Concernant encore les sanctions, un autre câble diplomatique référencé R221101Z du 22 janvier 2010 relate la rencontre entre le Chargé d'Affaires américain en poste à Maputo, Chapman Todd et Joaquim Chissano du 21 janvier 2010. Ce dernier a été accompagné de Leonardo Simao. Durant leur discussion, l'ancien Chef d'Etat mozambicain «a félicité les

Etats-Unis pour leur position sur Madagascar, la suspension de l'AGOA et la résiliation de l'accord MCA». Pour lui, ces mesures devront obliger Andry Rajoelina à être plus conciliant. La même note diplomatique affirme également que, pour Joaquim Chissano, la clé pour sortir Madagascar de l'impasse politique est «l'arrêt du soutien de la France à TGV». « Chissano a expliqué que tant que le TGV est confiant du soutien français, il continuerait à être inflexible envers les trois autres mouvements », ajoute le câble. Le médiateur a alors estimé qu'il faut que les Européens soient inflexibles sur le régime transitoire et que l'Allemagne doit s'impliquer davantage dans la résolution de la crise.

L.D.A

Samedi 03 septembre 2011

=====

D'AUTRES CABLES TOUJOURS AUSSI REVELATEURS

SUBJECT: CHISSANO ON MADAGASCAR: MUST PRESSURE THE FRENCH

REF: 09 MAPUTO 1042

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Todd Chapman for reasons 1.4 (b+d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: In a January 21 meeting, Former President and SADC Special Negotiator for Madagascar Joachim Chissano told the Charge that he commended the United States for its position on Madagascar, suspension of AGOA, and termination of the MCC Compact. Chissano said that SADC leaders decided in the January 14 Troika meeting in Maputo to ask France to stop supporting TGV, allowing for progress towards a transitional government. Chissano believes the key to breaking the current stalemate is halting France's support of TGV. Chissano believes that only when TGV is convinced that French support is weakening will he reconsider his options. Therefore, Chissano believes that Paris should be the focus of USG and European engagement on Madagascar. It is evident from this meeting that Chissano remains well-informed and committed to continued engagement as a mediator in Madagascar. With the recent support he received from SADC leaders, Chissano is available for further consultation with USG officials, something he said he would welcome. **END SUMMARY.**

—— CHISSANO COMMENDS U.S. POSITION ——

2. (C) On January 21, the Charge and Poloff met with President Chissano and his former Foreign Minister Leonardo Simao about the Madagascar political situation. Chissano supported the U.S. position on the suspension of Madagascar's AGOA eligibility and the MCC compact and appreciated his interaction with USG interlocutors at the Addis meeting in early January. The Charge provided Chissano with a copy of AF DAS Karl Wycoff's January 15 interview from America.gov and Chissano said he valued USG support for the SADC position and him personally.

—— AU PROPOSAL SAID TO BE FAIR ——

3. (C) Chissano did not detail AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping's proposal delivered January 21 in Antananarivo, but said it defines a fair distribution of prominent positions within the proposed transitional government in an effort to build consensus. Chissano noted that his assistant from the Foreign Ministry (MINEC), Nuno Tomaz was in Antananarivo with Chairman Ping. Chissano said that the international community should continue to work together to persuade all movements to adhere to the principals of the agreements made in Maputo and Addis and develop a credible transition plan.

— EUROPEANS NEED TO BE STRONGER AGAINST TGV —

4. (C) Chissano was visibly frustrated by France's position in support of TGV. He said French expatriates in Madagascar have established a direct link to President Sarkozy and convinced him that the best course for French interests is to support TGV. Chissano explained that as long as TGV was confident of French support, he would continue to be inflexible towards the other three movements and continue pushing for non-inclusive elections. The French are attempting to persuade the international community that TGV's proposed elections will be representative of the »voice of the people, » a claim which Chissano said he, SADC and the AU rejected.

5. (C) When asked about any other ideas about next steps or new approaches, Chissano said that, besides France, Rajoelina (TGV) also listens to Germany, which has not been sufficiently involved in the political situation in Madagascar. He suggested that the Germans engage to also recommend consensus-building between TGV and the other movements. Chissano commended the EU for »turning off the tap » of assistance to Madagascar. He mentioned that in recent negotiations the EU found itself in the difficult position of partially supporting the SADC and AU position on Madagascar, while at the same time not wanting to anger the French.

MAPUTO 00000075 002 OF 002

6. (C) While declaring TGV to be the main reason for the stalemate, he asserted that the other three movements are also sometimes being inflexible in their demands, particularly in regards to ministerial positions in the new transitional government. For example, Chissano said Zafy's demands for the Ministries of Energy and Mines were a non-starter. Chissano commented that in the recent discussions in Maputo, the three movements feared giving away too many powerful ministries to TGV, but Chissano tried to point out to them that these ministerial assignments would be of a short duration and should not be the cause for deterring a lasting political solution.

7. (C) Turning to the SADC Troika meeting on January 14 in Maputo following President Guebuza's inauguration, Chissano said that there was agreement for SADC to quietly contact the French and formally ask them to halt their support for TGV. The SADC leaders were resolved to maintain SADC engagement and to call for all movements to stick to what was agreed to in Maputo and Addis.

COMMENT: CHISSANO FRUSTRATED, MOSTLY WITH FRANCE

8. (C) Chissano, clearly frustrated with the pace of the Madagascar negotiations, believes that only when TGV is convinced that French support is weakening will he reconsider his options. Therefore, Chissano believes that Paris should be the focus of USG and European engagement. He never took a direct shot at Ping, but only commented that the AU proposal was very similar to the Maputo agreements and he looked forward to learning of the result of his meetings. If Chissano felt slighted by the AU in Addis in

early-January, he did not make those feelings apparent. It is evident from this meeting that Chissano remains well-informed and committed to continued engagement as a mediator in Madagascar. With the recent support he received from SADC leaders, Chissano is available for further consultation with USG officials, something he said he would welcome.

CHAPMAN

Le premier câble date de janvier 2010 et il décrit l'opinion de Chissano pour faire plier Andry Rajoelina pour que celui-ci accepte de négocier. Il est clairement établi qu'Andry Rajoelina restera intransigeant tant qu'il bénéficie d'un support total de la part du gouvernement français. Chissano a également déclaré que des expatriés français à Madagascar avaient un lien direct avec le président français et qu'ils l'ont persuadés que la meilleure solution était de supporter le parti TGV par tous les moyens. Cependant, Andry Rajoelina pourrait être également influencé par l'Allemagne, mais celle ne s'est pas engagée complètement dans la crise malgache et donc, la France est la seule qui peut faire pression sur TGV.

US embassy cable – 10ANTANANARIVO56

**MADAGASCAR: TGV'S CHOICES: ACCEPT PING PROPOSAL OR LEAVE OFFICE
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TGV'S CHOICES: ACCEPT PING PROPOSAL OR LEAVE**

OFFICE

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.5 d and e.

1. (S) Summary: Finally exasperated with Rajoelina's incompetence, a group from within his inner circle and the military will give him a stark: accept the Ping/AU »compromise » proposal, or stand aside to allow a consensual council to run Madagascar until elections. Rajoelina returns today from Paris and will be presented with this choice later this week. End Summary.

2. (C) Presidential Chief of Staff Zazah Ramandimbaraso (strictly protect) came to see me discreetly at the residence this morning. He had just returned from Addis where, with Foreign Minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, they had met with Ramtane Lamamra of the AU, the French and EU Ambassadors, and UN Under Secretary Lynn Pascoe and UN Political Affairs Director Haile Menkerios. He said they all had the same tough message: agree to consensus as proposed by Jean Ping, or sanctions and isolation will follow. The situation, he said, is very difficult.

3. (C) Zazah said he and others in the inner circle are preparing a letter to Jean Ping for TGV to sign when he returns from his private visit to Paris (perhaps later today). The draft letter essentially accepts the compromise proposal Ping left here on January 22. Zazah explained that some face-saving provisions, particularly involving the departure from the co-presidency of Ravalomanana nominee Fetison Rakoto

Andrianirina, would have to be managed, as Fetison and Rajoelina can no longer work together, he said. I told him that Fetison had told me he would not insist on holding his position if leaving would permit a resolution of the crisis, but that the issue needed to be worked in a consensual way involving all the parties — not forced unilaterally on Ravalomanana and Fetison. He also raised the issue of the consensus prime minister, suggesting — but not insisting — that Camille Vital might stay on in place of Eugene Mangalaza. I questioned whether Ravalomanana would accept Vital, who makes no effort to hide his dislike for the former President (whom he blames for ending his military career), but suggested that they continue to work on this as a package. The U.S., I said, will accept whatever compromise the Malagasy themselves can agree upon.

4. (S) Zazah then went into a long monologue about Rajoelina's incompetence, lack of decision-making ability, immaturity, instability, and general unfitness for his position. He regretted the rampant lawlessness, non-respect of human rights, and the despoilation of Madagadscar's natural resources for short-term gain under HAT rule. »The track record on governance is terrible », he said. He allowed that he is not optimistic that Rajoelina will accept to sign the draft letter, in which case he and others have developed a Plan B. Plan B is for Rajoelina to »step aside » in favor of a council or directorate composed of respected technocrats from across the political spectrum and perhaps some military officers. The council will then lead the country forward consensually to elections. He said Rajoelina will not want to accept this — »his ego is too big » — but the backing of the military for this plan — which Zazah says he enjoys — will help TGV realize that he has no choice. I insisted three times that another coup is not what Madagascar needs, and each time Zazah assured me that this will not be a coup, that the transition will amount to a consensual act, albeit one about which Rajoelina will have no choice. I asked who else is involved and he offered me an impressive list of TGV insiders and respected Generals who he said are behind Plan B. Military support is the key, he said.

5. (C) We then discussed ongoing efforts to create the consensus necessary for implementing the Ping proposal. I again deplored the arrest warrant against Co-President Fetison and explained my effort over the weekend to broker a meeting between Fetison and Camille Vital (which never took place). Zazah said Vital is among those on board with his plan and that he expects to be present later today when Fetison and Vital do finally meet. (He then called Vital in my presence to confirm this meeting.) I suggested that all the movements, including the moderates in the HAT, accept the invitation Fetison has sent out to the entire spectrum of political opinion and civil society for an »inclusive meeting » this Thursday and Friday at the Carlton Hotel. I said that the HAT has proven incapable of rallying any consensus, but could contribute to one by responding positively to the Fetison initiative. Zazah seemed to agree and said he would discuss this later today with Vital and Fetison. He agreed that time was extremely short before the Ping deadline expires and that there is no time to wait for other initiatives if sanctions and isolation are to be avoided.

6. (C) Regarding the threat of sanctions, I asked Zazah whether he thought that TGV was taking this seriously. Zazah said that the Paris visit, during which TGV spoke directly to Elysee Sec-Gen Claude Gueant, finally had removed the last doubt and hope from TGV's mind on this issue. Everyone, Zazah said, is now saying exactly the same thing, and there is no alternative left to accepting the Ping proposal (or Plan B). He said the French must now be thinking beyond TGV, looking for an acceptable alternative

to come to power through elections. »That's how they are — not loyal, and not

sentimental, » he opined. Zazah said he discounts rumors that Total is behind TGV: »they too are looking for alternatives. » He mentioned individual French politicians, including the French Senator for the Indian Ocean, as people who have been falsely assuring TGV that he can stand pat, but said that their promises are no longer credible to TGV. Zazah said he would also »talk to the French », but noted that Ambassador Chataigner is still in Paris. He said their charge d'affaires here is too closely linked to TGV Advisor (and dual national) Patrick Leloup; Leloup is a petty crook, Zazah said (and we agree), who has been giving TGV bad advice while going around shaking down businesses and looting the country. He therefore will not be speaking to the French charge.

7. (S) Comment: This move toward a »council » is not entirely a surprise, although its origin so deep within TGV's inner circle — rather than within the military — was not expected. At the same time, the gap between talk and action remains wide in Madagascar, and may remain so in this case too. For our parts, we will continue to push all parties together toward consensus as the AU deadline approaches. End Comment.

MARQUARDT

Le second cable date de février 2009 et il a été rédigé par Niels Marquardt. il indique que des proches d'Andry Rajoelina, notamment Zazah Ramandimbarasoa sont fatigués de la conduite d'Andry Rajoelina et de son intransigeance et qu'il lui proposent un ultimatum, soit il accepte la proposition de Jean Ping, soit il crée un nouveau Conseil consensuel qui dirigerait le pays et qui pourrait organiser des élections. Le fait qu'à cette époque, les responsables français et des Nations Unis avaient déclaré que les sanctions seraient plus sévères si le gouvernement malgache n'acceptait pas les propositions de Jean Ping. Il fallait aussi négocier le départ de Fetison Rakoto Andrianirina de la co-présidence et faire accepter à Marc Ravalomanana que le PM serait peut-être Camille Vital (ce dernier n'a pas caché son aversion pour l'ancien président, car celui-ci avait mis fin à sa carrière militaire).

Niels Marquardt écrit également que Zazah Ramandimbarasoa a longuement parlé de l'incompétence d'Andry Rajoelina, du non-respect des droits de l'homme et du pillage des ressources naturelles de Madagascar sur le court terme. Dans le cas où Andry Rajoelina ne signait pas la proposition de Jean Ping, Zazah Ramandimbarasoa et certains proches allaient créer un Conseil consensuel qui serait composé de technocrates et d'officiers militaire qui conduiraient le pays vers des élections libres. La condition est qu'Andry Rajoelina devrait quitter la présidence de la HAT et s'il refuse, la

présence d'officiers militaires dans ce conseil le convaincrat qu'il n'a pas le choix. Niels Marquardt a argué que ce n'était vraiment pas le moment pour Madagascar de connaître un second coup d'état, mais Zazah Ramandimbaraso a assuré que ce ne serait pas un coup d'état et qu'il sortirait le pays de la crise. De plus, Zazah Ramandimbaraso a présenté une liste impressionnante de généraux militaires qui supporteraient ce plan B et que la France devraient reconnaître l'échec d'Andry Rajoelina et qu'elle devrait maintenant regarder les autres alternatives possibles.

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: FRUSTRATION INCREASES AT FRENCH PRESIDENCY

REF: PARIS 216

Classified By: Wallace Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d).

1. (C) **SUMMARY:** Remi Marechaux, Africa Advisor at the French Presidency, on February 23 expressed his growing frustration with the lack of movement on Madagascar. He strongly criticized SADC mediator Chissano for not doing more, on a sustained basis, to drive the parties towards an agreement. He was equally critical of Rajoelina, although he said that Rajoelina, via a February 16 letter to AU Chairman Ping, agreed to work within the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework to arrive at a consensual way forward. Marechaux said that France now favored a return to that framework as well. Marechaux also criticized French lawyer/businessman Robert Bourgi, who Marechaux claimed had advised Rajoelina to seek money from Libya, with the Libyans puzzled by the request.

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) **Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on February 23 briefed Africa Watcher and Assistant on President Sarkozy's visit the next day to Gabon (reftel), after which we asked for an update on Madagascar. The normally cool and even-tempered Marechaux abruptly shifted gears, visibly frustrated and exasperated by what he termed a »complete lack of movement « on Madagascar. He first criticized SADC mediator Chissano, saying several times that he was not doing anything to advance the process. Marechaux said that the task of bringing the Malgache parties to agreement was a »full-time job « and that Chissano regrettably was not displaying the requisite energy**

and did not seem to have even the necessary interest. In Marechaux's view, Chissano was putting other activities ahead of his mediation role, frequently postponing Madagascar-related meetings. Marechaux said that Chissano should find a high-level deputy who could pursue the mediation on a full-time basis but he was not confident that that would happen.

3. (C) Repeating earlier criticism, Marechaux said that Chissano's poor handling of Maputo III (the event Rajoelina boycotted) was partly responsible for the breakdown of the process. Providing one example, he noted how the text of Maputo III significantly misinterpreted what the parties had earlier accepted regarding the two co-presidents. The earlier text set forth an arrangement where the two co-presidents operated together at a level below the president, whereas Maputo III, which was supposed to repeat elements of the earlier agreements, contained a provision making the president and two co-presidents members of one single body. Marechaux said that Chissano's failure to capture in Maputo III elements such as this that the parties had earlier accepted was a major error (whether deliberate or careless Marechaux could not say), and provided Rajoelina ample grounds for considering Maputo III a repudiation of the earlier agreements.

4. (C) Marechaux was nearly as strongly critical of Rajoelina as he had been of Chissano, saying that Rajoelina was intransigent and did not seem to understand the need to make concessions in order to deliver an agreement to everyone's benefit. Marechaux said, however, that Rajoelina seemed to be coming around, and he provided a copy of a February 16 letter from Rajoelina to AU Chairman Ping in which Rajoelina appeared to agree to return to the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework and work with Ping and the others. (Note: We have sent a copy of this letter to the Department and Embassy Antananarivo. End note.) To Marechaux's dismay, there had been little follow-up to Rajoelina's letter, either by Ping or Chissano. Marechaux stated that at one point the French encouraged Rajoelina strongly to work with Ping. To counter Rajoelina's apparent discomfort at working with the AU (»the Malgache have always viewed themselves as distinct from Africa and Africans »), the French said that Ping's Afro-Asian background in fact made him very much like a Malgache.

5. (C) Marechaux said that France favored returning to the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework as a point of departure. (Note: The French had once claimed that Maputo/Addis Ababa was dead but found themselves isolated and have dropped that position. End note.) He repeated the need for all parties to return to work, and he especially repeated his hope that Chissano would become more active and as soon as possible.

6. (C) Marechaux offered a final scathing criticism of French lawyer, businessman, and reputed behind-the-scenes-fixer Robert Bourgi, often viewed as a throwback figure to the classic »France-Afrique « era (the vestiges of which are still with us). Marechaux called Bourgi a »mercenary « always out for his own interest as he worked to gain favor with African leaders such as Gabon's Bongo and, more recently, Rajoelina. Marechaux said that Bourgi had suggested to Rajoelina that Libya might be a source of funding, which prompted Rajoelina, according to Marechaux, to approach the Libyans to request some 200,000 euro (about USD 270,000). The Libyans reportedly responded with bewilderment and did not provide the money. Marechaux referred to a photo of a public event in Madagascar that showed Bourgi and his associates a row or two down from where Rajoelina was sitting, which caused Marechaux to denounce them for contributing to speculation that France was secretly controlling Rajoelina behind the scenes. Marechaux also forcefully denied reports that the French were trying to obtain DRC support for Rajoelina. He elaborated that during a recent visit by the DRC Foreign Minister, the Presidency's Africa cell discussed the lack of progress in Madagascar's political stalemate and pointed out the discrepancies Chissano permitted (as noted above) in the hope that the DRC, as the current SADC Chair, could help push the process forward. Marechaux continued to criticize Bourgi and his ilk but, in order to avoid provoking another tirade, we refrained from pointing out that according to the press, Bourgi was going to travel to Gabon with Sarkozy in Sarkozy's plane.

PARIS 00000232 002 OF 002

7. (C) COMMENT: Every time we speak to Marechaux about Madagascar, his frustration and exasperation seem to go up a notch or two, which is perhaps understandable given the nature of the crisis and the difficult role the French are perceived as having chosen to play. However, his main point — that all parties need to make a sustained effort to move towards a solution and that the outside mediators need to do more to drive this process — came through loud and clear.

END COMMENT.

8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEKALA

Le troisième câble date toujours de février 2009 et il concerne la frustration du gouvernement français concernant le blocage de la crise malgache. Rémi Maréchaux, le conseiller du président français pour l'Afrique, a clairement critiqué Chissano de son manque d'efforts et de communication envers les différentes étapes des négociations. L'un des meilleurs exemples de l'incompétence de Chissano concerne Maputo III qui devait officialiser les précédents arrangements, à savoir, deux co-présidents qui devaient être sous l'autorité du président de la Transition. Mais la négociation de Maputo III a changé les termes de cette négociation en arguant que les deux co-président et le président de HAT ne représentaient qu'une seule entité. Face à ce manque de communication, Andry Rajoelina a eu la voie libre pour renier ses précédents engagements en déclarant que l'accord était caduque, car il n'a jamais accepté ces conditions pour le partage du pouvoir.

Rémi Maréchaux a également déclaré que la Lybie pouvait devenir une bonne source de financement pour Andry Rajoelina. Ce dernier a demandé une aide d'environ 200 000 dollars que les lybiens ont refusés. Marechaux a également mentionné une photo qui montrait Andry Rajoelina et Robert Bourgui qui étaient assis côte à côte. De ce fait, Marechaux a critiqué le fait que c'était une tentative pour prouver que la France contrôlait Andry Rajoelina. Marechaux a également nié le fait que la France faisait pression sur la République Démocratique du Congo pour qu'elle supporte Andry Rajoelina. L'une des raisons est que la RDC était la présidente temporaire de la SADC à cette époque et qu'Andry Rajoelina aurait un allié de taille dans l'Union Africaine et les membres de SADC.

A chaque fois qu'on parlait de Madagascar avec Marechaux, on avait l'impression que sa colère et sa frustration augmentaient de plus en plus à cause de l'enlisement de la situation et le fait que le rôle de la France était extrêmement difficile, car d'un coté, elle ne pouvait supporter ouvertement Andry Rajoelina et de l'autre, prétendre qu'elle était contre les prises illégales de pouvoir.

US embassy cable – 10PARIS232

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: FRUSTRATION INCREASES AT FRENCH PRESIDENCY

REF: PARIS 216

Classified By: Wallace Bain, Political Officer, 1.4 (b/d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Remi Marechaux, Africa Advisor at the French Presidency, on February 23 expressed his growing frustration with the lack of movement on Madagascar. He strongly criticized SADC mediator Chissano for not doing more, on a sustained basis, to drive the parties towards an agreement. He was equally critical of Rajoelina, although he said that Rajoelina, via a February 16 letter to AU Chairman Ping, agreed to work within the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework to arrive at a consensual way forward. Marechaux said that France now favored a return to that framework as well. Marechaux also criticized French lawyer/businessman Robert Bourgi, who Marechaux claimed had advised Rajoelina to seek money from Libya, with the Libyans puzzled by the request.

END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on February 23 briefed Africa Watcher and Assistant on President Sarkozy's visit the next day to Gabon (reftel), after which we asked for an update on Madagascar. The normally cool and even-tempered Marechaux abruptly shifted gears, visibly frustrated and exasperated by what he termed a »complete lack of movement « on Madagascar. He first criticized SADC mediator Chissano, saying several times that he was not doing anything to advance the process. Marechaux said that the task of bringing the Malgache parties to agreement was a »full-time job « and that Chissano regrettably was not displaying the requisite energy and did not seem to have even the necessary interest. In Marechaux's view, Chissano was putting other activities ahead of his mediation role, frequently postponing Madagascar-related meetings. Marechaux said that Chissano should find a high-level deputy who could pursue the mediation on a full-time basis but he was not confident that that would happen.

3. (C) Repeating earlier criticism, Marechaux said that Chissano's poor handling of Maputo III (the event Rajoelina boycotted) was partly responsible for the breakdown of the process. Providing one example, he noted how the text of Maputo III significantly misinterpreted what the parties had earlier accepted regarding the two co-presidents. The earlier text set forth an arrangement where the two co-presidents operated together at a level below the president, whereas Maputo III, which was supposed to repeat elements of the earlier agreements, contained a provision making the president and two co-presidents members of one single body. Marechaux said that Chissano's failure to

capture in Maputo III elements such as this that the parties had earlier accepted was a major error (whether deliberate or careless Marechaux could not say), and provided Rajoelina ample grounds for considering Maputo III a repudiation of the earlier agreements.

4. (C) Marechaux was nearly as strongly critical of Rajoelina as he had been of Chissano, saying that Rajoelina was intransigent and did not seem to understand the need to make concessions in order to deliver an agreement to everyone's benefit. Marechaux said, however, that Rajoelina seemed to be coming around, and he provided a copy of a February 16 letter from Rajoelina to AU Chairman Ping in which Rajoelina appeared to agree to return to the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework and work with Ping and the others. (Note: We have sent a copy of this letter to the Department and Embassy Antananarivo. End note.) To Marechaux's dismay, there had been little follow-up to Rajoelina's letter, either by Ping or Chissano. Marechaux stated that at one point the French encouraged Rajoelina strongly to work with Ping. To counter Rajoelina's apparent discomfort at working with the AU (»the Malgache have always viewed themselves as distinct from Africa and Africans »), the French said that Ping's Afro-Asian background in fact made him very much like a Malgache.

5. (C) Marechaux said that France favored returning to the Maputo/Addis Ababa framework as a point of departure. (Note: The French had once claimed that Maputo/Addis Ababa was dead but found themselves isolated and have dropped that position. End note.) He repeated the need for all parties to return to work, and he especially repeated his hope that Chissano would become more active and as soon as possible.

6. (C) Marechaux offered a final scathing criticism of French lawyer, businessman, and reputed behind-the-scenes-fixer Robert Bourgi, often viewed as a throwback figure to the classic »France-Afrique » era (the vestiges of which are still with us). Marechaux called Bourgi a »mercenary » always out for his own interest as he worked to gain favor with African leaders such as Gabon's Bongo and, more recently, Rajoelina. Marechaux said that Bourgi had suggested to Rajoelina that Libya might be a source of funding, which prompted Rajoelina, according to Marechaux, to approach the Libyans to request some 200,000 euro (about USD 270,000). The Libyans reportedly responded with bewilderment and did not provide the money. Marechaux referred to a photo of a public event in Madagascar that showed Bourgi and his associates a row or two down from where Rajoelina was sitting, which caused Marechaux to denounce them for contributing to speculation that France was secretly controlling Rajoelina behind the scenes. Marechaux also forcefully denied reports that the French were trying to obtain DRC support for Rajoelina. He elaborated that during a recent visit by the DRC Foreign Minister, the

Presidency's Africa cell discussed the lack of progress in Madagascar's political stalemate and pointed out the discrepancies Chissano permitted (as noted above) in the hope that the DRC, as the current SADC Chair, could help push the process forward. Marechaux continued to criticize Bourgi and his ilk but, in order to avoid provoking another tirade, we refrained from pointing out that according to the press, Bourgi was going to travel to Gabon with Sarkozy in Sarkozy's plane.

PARIS 0000232 002 OF 002

7. (C) COMMENT: Every time we speak to Marechaux about Madagascar, his frustration and exasperation seem to go up a notch or two, which is perhaps understandable given the nature of the crisis and the difficult role the French are perceived as having chosen to play. However, his main point — that all parties need to make a sustained effort to move towards a solution and that the outside mediators need to do more to drive this process — came through loud and clear.

END COMMENT.

8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEKALA

Le troisième câble date toujours de février 2009 et il concerne la frustration du gouvernement français concernant le blocage de la crise malgache. Rémi Maréchaux, le conseiller du président français pour l'Afrique, a clairement critiqué Chissano de son manque d'efforts et de communication envers les différentes étapes des négociations. L'un des meilleurs exemples de l'incompétence de Chissano concerne Maputo III qui devait officialiser les précédents arrangements, à savoir, deux co-présidents qui devaient être sous l'autorité du président de la Transition. Mais la négociation de Maputo III a changé les termes de cette négociation en arguant que les deux co-président et le président de HAT ne représentaient qu'une seule entité. Face à ce manque de communication, Andry Rajoelina a eu la voie libre pour renier ses précédents engagements en déclarant que l'accord était caduque, car il n'a jamais accepté ces conditions pour le partage du pouvoir.

Rémi Maréchaux a également déclaré que la Lybie pouvait devenir une bonne source de

financement pour Andry Rajoelina. Ce dernier a demandé une aide d'environ 200 000 dollars que les lybiens ont refusés. Marechaux a également mentionné une photo qui montrait Andry Rajoelina et Robert Bourgui qui étaient assis côte à côte. De ce fait, Marechaux a critiqué le fait que c'était une tentative pour prouver que la France contrôlait Andry Rajoelina. Marechaux a également nié le fait que la France faisait pression sur la République Démocratique du Congo pour qu'elle supporte Andry Rajoelina. L'une des raisons est que la RDC était la présidente temporaire de la SADC à cette époque et qu'Andry Rajoelina aurait un allié de taille dans l'Union Africaine et les membres de SADC.

A chaque fois qu'on parlait de Madagascar avec Marechaux, on avait l'impression que sa colère et sa frustration augmentaient de plus en plus à cause de l'enlisement de la situation et le fait que le rôle de la France était extrêmement difficile, car d'un coté, elle ne pouvait supporter ouvertement Andry Rajoelina et de l'autre, prétendre qu'elle était contre les prises illégales de pouvoir.

Evidemment, ce ne sont que quelques cables que j'ai trouvé intéressants, mais il y a d'autres, notamment pendant la période 2009. Je me demande ce que les journalistes malgaches foutent de leur journée plutôt que trier les informations de ces cables. Cela leur donnerait une meilleure compréhension de ce qui se passe dans les coulisses des différents pays engagés dans cette crise. Une chose qu'on remarque avec ces câbles est que la position d'Andry Rajoelina était très menacée pendant l'année 2010, mais comme d'habitude, les éminences grises telles que Ratsirahonana ont su profiter de la situation. L'idée de ce Conseil consensuel était intéressante si elle restait fidèle à ses principes, mais les événements nous ont montrés que ce conseil consensuel est devenu le pathétique Conseil de la Transition. Pire encore, il a permis de renforcer la position d'Andry Rajoelina aux yeux de la communauté internationale. Ces câbles nous éclairent également sur l'une des raisons de l'éviction de Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, car il était favorable à la création de ce Conseil. Donc, son éviction viendrait principalement de là plutôt que du fiasco de l'ONU.